Summary Report "Making the PES business case" by Mosley, Hugh & Speckesser, Stefan
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341408922
MAKING THE PES BUSINESS CASE
Technical Report · March 2017
DOI: 10.2767/166379
CITATIONS
0
READ
1
2 authors, including:
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Implementations- und Wirkungsanalysen der PSA View project
Hugh Mosley
Independent consultant
41 PUBLICATIONS   296 CITATIONS   
SEE PROFILE
All content following this page was uploaded by Hugh Mosley on 15 May 2020.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
Employment,
Social Affairs
and Inclusion
MARCH 2017
SUMMARY REPORT
PES NETWORK SEMINAR  
‘MAKING THE PES  
BUSINESS CASE’
More information on the European Union is available on the internet (http://europa.eu).
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017
ISBN 978-92-79-67329-0
doi:10.2767/166379
© European Union, 2017
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Cover picture: © European Union
The European Network of Public Employment Services was created following a Decision of the European Parliament and Council in June 
2014 (DECISION No 573/2014/EU). Its objective is to reinforce PES capacity, effectiveness and efficiency. This activity has been developed 
within the work programme of the European PES Network. For further information: http://ec.europa.eu/social/PESNetwork.
This activity has received financial support from the European Union Programme for Employment and Social Innovation "EaSI" (2014-2020). 
For further information please consult: http://ec.europa.eu/social/easi  
LEGAL NOTICE
This document has been prepared for the European Commission however it reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission 
cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers 
to your questions about the European Union.
Freephone number (*):
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls  
(though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).
Written by Dr. Hugh Mosley, Consultant Employment Policy  
and Stefan Speckesser, Institute for Employment Studies,  
in collaboration with ICF
MARCH 2017
SUMMARY REPORT
PES NETWORK SEMINAR  
‘MAKING THE PES  
BUSINESS CASE’
44
1.  Introduction 5
2.  Accountability and transparency in decision-making 5
3. Accountability in decentralised PES 6
4. Measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of PES programmes and services 7
5. Measuring the impact of PES services  7
6.  Communicating the added  value of PES 9
7. Closing reflections and future directions 11
Contents
55
1.  Introduction
In the private sector, business-case analysis is 
a management tool supporting decision-making on 
whether to take a particular course of action or cho-
sen alternative. Today, business case analysis is 
increasingly used in government agencies, including 
in PES management. Based on available data and 
information the costs, benefits and risks of a par-
ticular course of action are systematically assessed. 
It serves not only as a basis for initial decision- 
making but also as an essential element of project 
management, identifying success factors and 
expected outcomes in terms of which performance 
can be assessed. It is also a form of communication 
and persuasion used to gain support for a particu-
lar course of action or programme. 
The importance of making the PES business case 
has been a topic discussed within the PES Network 
and the European Commission and it was further 
explored during the ‘Making the PES Business Case’ 
seminar, which took place in Brussels on 17 January 
2017. The goal of the seminar was to carry the 
 discussion forward and to better understand 
what drives PES investments and decisions and how 
decision- making can be improved; how to justify 
decisions to stakeholders and how to articulate 
the wider benefits of PES services to citizens and 
society as a whole (public value). The seminar par-
ticipants emphasised in particular two aspects 
of ’making the business case’, evidenced-based 
programmes and policies based on good data 
 collection and evaluation practices as well as com-
munication not only with stakeholders but also of 
the public benefits of PES activities. It was often 
expressed that good results are not sufficiently 
recognised. 
The seminar posed the following guiding questions 
to participants:
 ● How can/do PES measure the socio and 
economic impact of services on the labour 
market (and wider society)?
 ● What steps can be undertaken to better 
measure impact of PES activities and how can 
the outcomes be shared with stakeholders?
 ● How do results inform future decisions of the 
PES on services, measures and processes?
In addition to plenary discussions, separate work-
shops addressed four specific aspects of the topic: 
Accountability
 ● How can PES develop and foster transparency 
in decision-making and accountability? 
 ● Who are PES accountable to and how do they 
provide information?
Measuring quality and efficiency
 ● How are PES measuring the quality and 
efficiency of their services including on specific 
target groups and the wider labour market? 
 ● What can PES learn from the wider public 
sector?
Measuring impact
 ● How and where are PES measuring the macro 
socio-economic impact of their activities? 
What areas of impact are measured? 
 ● What information is used to demonstrate 
return on investments? To whom? 
Communicating the added-value of the PES
 ● How do PES engage in strategic 
communication activities to show the impact 
they have on their target audience? 
 ● How do PES use communication activities 
to create awareness of their services and 
measures?
This report summarises the seminar contributions 
and findings structured according to the four prin-
cipal thematic areas covered: accountability; 
measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of PES 
programmes and services; measuring impact; 
and lastly, communicating the added value of the 
PES. The report concludes a discussion of future 
directions for learning. 
2.  Accountability and transparency 
in decision-making
Making the business case to PES supervising 
authorities and other stakeholders is based in 
the first instance on performance accountability. 
Performance accountability in modern PES is 
 usually based on some form of management by 
objectives (MBO) and formalised in an annual per-
formance agreement between the PES and its 
supervising authority, normally the responsible 
ministry. It states the goals to be pursued and tar-
gets to be achieved during the course of the agree-
ment, ideally co-ordinated with the personnel and 
financial resources available to the PES in order 
to achieve these objectives. The annual business 
plan with clear goals and performance targets 
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makes decision-making and responsibilities trans-
parent, both internally and externally, and provides 
an agreed basis for assessing performance at all 
levels of the organisation. A management informa-
tion and controlling system should ideally provide 
real time information on progress toward targets 
based on agreed indicators. Performance results 
for the national PES and for local units are usually 
available on a monthly basis and reported regularly 
to the responsible governing board, ministry, or, in 
the case of decentralised systems, local authori-
ties. Performance results are made available to the 
general public at least annually. Transparency is an 
essential element of accountability at both the 
national and policy implementation levels.
This management approach has immense benefits 
for ‘making the PES business case’. It clearly 
defines the expectations in terms of which PES 
performance can be assessed by supervising 
authorities, other stakeholders and the public at 
large. If the subject of a genuine and open nego-
tiation coupled with agreement over the necessary 
resources to achieve the stated targets – which 
may not always be the case, it provides a realistic 
and objective basis for judging PES performance. 
Otherwise the PES, seeking to be a principal labour 
market public actor and ideally ‘conductor’, may 
easily find itself on a ‘mission impossible’ – facing 
unrealistically high and conflicting expectations 
without adequate resources. 
Both the concrete PES accountability frameworks 
– to whom, what and how they report – and their 
accountability challenges depend on their govern-
ance structures and, whether they are national 
hierarchically structured organisations, decentral-
ised or, in some countries, have outsourced many 
functions in more market-based environments. 
In centralised systems, national PES are account-
able directly to their own governing bodies or 
responsible ministries, depending on whether they 
are a constituent part of a ministerial department 
(e.g. UK), an executive agency directly subordinate 
to a ministry (e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Czech Republic), or an autonomous tripartite 
authority (e.g. Germany). In general, the latter tend 
to have significant financial and decision-making 
autonomy under policy guidelines set by law and 
the supervising ministry, whereas executive agen-
cies are directly subordinate to the ministry with 
only limited discretion in implementation. Like all 
public agencies, the PES are ultimately accounta-
ble to government and parliament. 
PES that are part of a ministry, or an executive 
agency subordinate to the ministry, are accountable 
to and report directly to the ministry, whereas the 
PES that are autonomous public bodies report in the 
first instance to their own governing board. What 
and how reporting takes place varies of course con-
siderably depending on the particular PES organisa-
tion and can be influenced by the prevailing political 
situation. 
In a mature performance management system, 
desired employment policy objectives are converted 
into a clearly defined set of goals and  performance 
targets for the PES as a whole and for the subordi-
nate levels of the organisation. This serves as the 
basis for an annual business plan and performance 
accountability. Progress toward targets is continu-
ally monitored at all levels of the organisation and 
reported periodically throughout the business year. 
Regional and local offices are accountable in the 
same way to higher levels of the organisation. 
3. Accountability in  
decentralised PES
In decentralised PES business models, lower tiers 
of government (typically regions or municipalities) 
are directly responsible for implementing labour 
market services. In this case the implementing 
agencies are no longer subordinate departments 
of a central administration but autonomous politi-
cal entities, or agencies created by them. In such 
complex multilevel governance the relationship 
between central and regional or local authorities 
is inherently less hierarchical and accountability 
is often weaker, from the perspective of central 
authorities. There is a trade-off between local 
flexibility and central accountability. 
Peter Graversen (The Danish Agency for Labour 
Market and Recruitment) presented the recent 
reforms in the accountability framework of the 
Danish PES, in which there is a far-reaching decen-
tralisation of responsibility for implementation to 
the municipalities. Although regulated by national 
law and nationally funded, the 94 municipal 
Jobcentres are agencies or departments of the 
self-governing municipalities and, unlike the for-
mer local PES agencies, they are neither part 
of the PES nor subject to its hierarchical policy 
direction. In order to ensure central accountability 
in the context of political decentralisation there is 
a complex regulatory and management framework 
the principal elements of which are: 
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1. Minimum statutory standards for municipal 
labour market services;
2. Reliance on financial incentives in the form 
of conditional state reimbursements of part 
of the costs of benefits to the municipalities 
instead of administrative supervision;
3. National IT-systems that ensure full 
transparency of results and efforts across 
municipalities;
4. A parallel system of dialogue-based 
performance management.
The new simplified reimbursement system intro-
duced in January 2017 involves a step by step 
reduction in the reimbursement rate with increas-
ing, cumulative duration of unemployment. It is 
intended to encourage the municipal jobcentres to 
undertake early efforts to reintegrate the unem-
ployed. There is a risk that the emphasis on quick 
reintegration may be at the cost of getting people 
into more suitable jobs. In Germany, for example, 
there are performance indicators not only for 
faster reintegration but also for the suitability and 
quality of employment offers. In such a decentral-
ised system, it is important to share knowledge 
and experience across municipalities as to what 
works and what doesn’t. The Danish Agency for 
Labour Market and Recruitment (STAR), at the 
national PES level, plays a central role here as well 
as in the system of dialogue-based performance 
management. 
4. Measuring the efficiency 
and effectiveness of PES 
programmes and services
The efficiency and effectiveness of PES, as for other 
market interventions by government agencies, can 
be described and analysed from two perspectives. 
An organisational view (as a function of manage-
ment and productive efficiency), and scrutiny of 
economic efficiency and effectiveness (at micro and 
macroeconomic level) can both be obtained. 
The organisational and managerial perspective is 
an applied problem of production technology: how 
to allocate the inputs into the production process 
in an optimal way to achieve the highest possible 
level of output. Benchmarking of productive effi-
ciency, e.g. using local PES office data, represents 
an extremely useful exercise to uncover the maxi-
mum possible output of a PES at given resources 
and to understand how efficient the production 
process for the output is. However the analysis of 
productive efficiency cannot tell us what specific 
combination of outputs (e. g. programmes and ser-
vices) to produce. To understand the specific com-
bination of outputs which should be chosen is 
a question of allocative efficiency.
The allocative efficiency and economic effective-
ness of PES at micro and macroeconomic levels is 
normally discussed in terms of the labour market 
effects achieved and whether their interventions 
have improved outcomes relative to non-interven-
tion in the market, i.e. whether additional employ-
ment opportunities were achieved. The economic 
effectiveness of PES refers to measures of cost-
effectiveness. Therefore, economic effectiveness 
is usually assessed in an economic cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA). CBA is not a replacement for politi-
cal choice; it only offers a particular method of pol-
icy impact analysis to provide learning and present 
choices on the basis of a consistent evidence-base 
utilising a series of CBAs to make improvements in 
market interventions. 
5. Measuring the impact 
of PES services 
The first important element in measuring the eco-
nomic effectiveness of PES interventions is there-
fore to obtain an estimate of the programme 
impacts for participants, i.e. increased employment 
rates, earnings and reduced benefit dependency 
because of a successful intervention. These net 
impacts over the counterfactual can be obtained 
from various types of empirical evaluations, which 
measure the observed outcomes of participants 
and compare them to a counterfactual measure 
of non-participation for the same set of outcomes 
(e.g. employment, earnings). The main methods 
to estimate counterfactuals used for PES interven-
tions are Random Control Trials (RCT). With RCT, an 
experimental design allocates two groups with 
similar characteristics, for example specific types 
of jobseekers, to intervention and control groups 
in a medical trial. In practice, a great variety of 
other research design is applied to obtain quanti-
tative impact estimates of programmes. These 
range from qualitative methods and systematic 
collection of stakeholder information via survey 
questions about the increased employment for 
participants, to before-after comparisons of indi-
viduals. In order to understand the economic 
impact of programmes, for example increases in 
employment rates or transition rates from benefit 
receipt to employment, these designs are often 
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less robust. This is because the (implicit or explicit) 
estimation of the counterfactual outcome requires 
more assumptions than for an RCT or if differ-
ences between participant and counterfactual are 
explicitly addressed. 
Information used to demonstrate  
return on investment
Amongst the key measures of social benefits are; 
the number of genuinely additional employment 
opportunities, the related earnings and further 
employment-related impact measures from 
reduced benefit payments to increased labour tax-
ation, increased consumption and potential 
employer’s profit related to additional employ-
ment. On the other hand, the main social costs are 
programme expenditure and further charges 
incurred by the individual (e.g. childcare cost or 
lost home production). Therefore, firstly the num-
ber of additional jobs from any PES intervention 
needs to be estimated. 
Once estimated and additional employment and 
earnings gains from PES interventions have been 
identified, a Cost-Benefit Accounting Framework 
needs to be established to estimate the social 
returns from programmes and related costs in 
monetary terms. Such an accounting framework 
transforms the economic impact measures (addi-
tional employment) into monetary values using 
specific valuation parameters, for example using 
observed programme costs or the wages for the 
additional employment gained from administra-
tive data. Implementing a CBA using such a frame-
work results in identifying monetary values of 
aggregate costs and benefits for society at large, 
i.e. to understand whether gross earnings and 
work benefit outweigh the social investment, in 
particular the programme operating costs. It can 
also be used to derive net economic benefits for 
specific stakeholders, for example the government 
or the individual.
Using evidence on economic effectiveness 
and CBA to facilitate decision making
The economic analysis of PES in terms of produc-
tive and allocative efficiency offers important 
opportunities to improve the operational work 
within PES as well as to more generally enhance 
provision for PES customers enabling them to 
access programmes which offer them the great-
est possible benefit in regaining and retaining 
employment. However, this can only be achieved 
if the evidence base for PES efficiency and effec-
tiveness evolves continuously, is up-to-date, 
accessible and jargon-free to a wide variety of 
stakeholders, both inside PES and for wider stake-
holders including social partners and national 
governments. 
At the heart of an evolving evidence-base, which 
facilitates learning for better PES decision making, 
is the continuous analysis of programme impacts 
and effectiveness of PES intervention and the 
 subsequent application of economic analysis to 
establish measures of cost-effectiveness. Such an 
analysis needs to be undertaken for all major pro-
grammes, repeatedly over time as the economic 
cycle and further circumstances change, and must 
consider the main client groups so as to account 
for possible heterogeneity in programme impacts. 
Over time, the growing evidence base of rigorous 
studies of programme effects will help improve 
both programme provision and PES operations 
provided that the research designs chosen suffi-
ciently address the issue of estimating the benefit 
above ‘business-as-usual’ or counterfactual 
non-intervention. 
CBA can serve as a powerful tool for policy learn-
ing if the evidence of economic net benefit of PES 
interventions is consistently applied in a coherent 
cost-benefit framework, so that all programmes 
can be consistently assessed in terms of spend-
ing-return ratios. Without a CBA linked to every 
micro (and macro) economic study on programme 
impacts, it is not possible to make clear decisions 
about the best resource allocation as programme 
costs vary substantially. Therefore, net employ-
ment gained from market interventions as shown 
by rigorous impact studies needs to be related to 
a clear estimate of the individual and social cost 
for specific interventions.
Such work would have to establish clear and uni-
versal CBA models across all varieties of PES 
intervention and relate spending on specific pro-
gramme to empirical estimates of programme 
impacts and related information in order to derive 
the social benefit from additional employment. 
Implemented consistently across PES, CBA would 
facilitate the allocation of resources to make best 
use of PES spending in the light of anticipated 
social benefits of programmes using a common 
currency, i.e. net social benefit in monetary terms. 
The models could also be used to derive spending-
return ratios such as social returns to investment, 
for example to decide about the best programme 
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to choose if all those for a specific target group 
show positive net benefits. 
Participants noted the challenging prerequisites for 
continuous analysis of PES programme impacts 
and effectiveness with regard to data collection, 
continuity in the analytical framework and, implic-
itly, in the policy environment. Political frameworks 
change regularly and impact evaluation and CBA 
require a considerable time span for data col-
lection and analysis. That CBA results may vary 
depending on actors' perspectives, society, partici-
pants and government. In practice this means that 
they also vary for different interest groups or even 
departments or levels of government. Ideally, the 
CBA results provide a basis showing the broader 
social value of PES activities, for which the costs 
but not the benefits are very explicit. 
Torben Schewe (Federal Employment Agency 
Germany) presented an overview of tools and 
approaches for impact analysis in Germany with 
particular attention to the ‘TrEffeR’ methodology, 
designed to measure the effectiveness of active 
labour market programmes. TrEffeR is only one 
approach used in addition to randomised and nat-
ural experiments. TrEffeR uses the extensive 
microdata available to the PES for its clients 
(insured unemployed people) to construct ex-post 
a control group of statistical twins for programme 
participants. Measured results are mixed: 
 ● ‘In-firm’ programmes like wage subsidies, 
start-up subsidies and short trainings with 
a practical focus (internships) improve the 
employment prospects of the treated 
individuals;
 ● Vocational training/retraining and short 
classroom training shows only slightly 
positive effects on employment prospects;
 ● Job creation schemes do not improve 
employment prospects;
 ● Mixed results have been reported for private 
placement and counselling services. 
TrEffeR is, however, only a partial analysis since, 
for example, windfall gains and substitution 
effects are not included. Moreover, some target 
groups are not covered by TrEffeR, for example, 
unemployed young and disabled people since not 
enough data is available to create the relevant 
control groups. It is however deemed quite useful 
for a variety of purposes including, product devel-
opment, optimisation of allocation strategies and 
internal control of costs and success. 
The Danish PES, and ACTRIS (the Belgian-Wallonia 
PES), also report using a control group methodology. 
Denmark includes social data in the PES data base 
in order to provide necessary information for 
matched comparisons. Programme cost data is only 
available for harder to place target groups because 
they are outsourced, not for services provided directly 
by Jobcentres, except for counselling. VDAB (the 
Belgian-Flanders PES) relies heavily on an evidence-
based approaches to ensure that measures reach the 
right target groups. It has recently introduced activ-
ity based costing as part of its effort to measure 
long-term efficiency/effectiveness of measures. In 
addition, the Lithuanian PES relies primarily on cus-
tomer satisfaction surveys to improve services and 
monitors key indicators of active labour market 
measures based on administrative data. 
6.  Communicating the added  
 value of PES
The PES is a public service with a large number of 
stakeholders and millions of customers and obvi-
ously engages in extensive communication as part 
of its day-to-day activities. Strategic communica-
tion here is a special segment apart from routine 
operational communication activities that aims to 
maintain the corporate image of the PES as an 
institution and support management of its rela-
tionships with key stakeholders. Both the reputation 
of the PES as an institution as well as its success-
ful functioning and performance in the labour 
market depend on the continuing willingness of 
these actors to work with and support it.
Strategic communication also implies that com-
munication activities are planned and organised in 
a systematic way as an element of strategic man-
agement. Whether, and to what extent, PES engage 
in strategic communication is unclear. There has 
been relatively little study of communication activ-
ities in the public sector as a whole and there is no 
systematic study of PES strategic communication 
practices and strategies.
As a minimum strategic communication requires 
the following points: 
 ● Definition of PES identity and role;
 ● Identification of key stakeholder groups 
at all levels;
 ● Definition of the goals of PES communication 
and a communication strategy for each 
stakeholder group;
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 ● Effective management of its relationships to 
key stakeholders, customers and the public; 
and 
 ● Regular stocktaking of communication and 
working relationships, listening as well as 
telling. 
In the course of public sector management 
reforms over the past two decades public sector 
organisations have become more concerned about 
their corporate image and reputation. A strong cor-
porate image is deemed to pay benefits in terms 
of public support, protection from political criticism, 
as a part of presenting the PES case in debates 
concerning possible outsourcing and privatisation, 
and protecting staff morale and recruitment. 
Nevertheless, strategic communication is more 
constrained in important respects and reputation 
management more difficult in the public as 
opposed to the private sector. 
The literature on reputation management in the 
public sector indicates that government and pub-
lic sector service agencies are regarded more 
sceptically and have a poorer reputation than their 
corporate counterparts, albeit with considerable 
variation in attitudes across countries and among 
different types of services.
Greta Metka Barbo Škerbinc (Employment Service 
of Slovenia) presented the communication strat-
egy of the Slovenian PES adopted in December 
2015, as part of their 2020 Strategy. Its purpose 
is to define services to different target groups 
and increase their utility, to achieve a better 
understanding of PES activities and to improve 
its image. It defines the PES as a user-focused 
organisation that is a key facilitator in the labour 
market. Although the Slovenian PES is responsi-
ble to the ministry, it is an independent institution 
and has developed its own centrally planned 
communication strategy and involved internal 
staff in communication activities on a daily basis. 
The strategy is summarized in a written docu-
ment and identifies internal and external target 
audiences and external target groups. Different 
communication strategies are defined for differ-
ent target groups: users of PES services, provid-
ers, the public sector and other stakeholders. The 
ministry is defined as an external stakeholder 
with whom the PES co-operates, providing data 
on a weekly basis. A variety of media and com-
munication avenues are used tailored to differ-
ent user and stakeholder groups. The Slovenian 
PES also undertakes regular reviews of their 
employer strategy to understand how employ-
ers want to be communicated with and uses 
focus groups, e.g. to develop online services. 
Employers and other stakeholders were consulted 
in the development of the PES communications 
strategy. 
Participants emphasised that communication 
should be local as well as national. In Denmark 
data provided to local media and stakeholders on 
the local employment situation has made the 
Jobcentre more relevant. Positive messages are 
also important not just information on unemploy-
ment rates, examples are data on the number of 
vacancies (VDAB) or on job growth. Greater trans-
parency in France means that information is pub-
lished twice a year for four strategic indicators 
(return to employment, timely payment of benefits, 
employer and employee satisfaction and case-
loads). This information is also presented in disag-
gregated form to the local tier in press conferences. 
Some PES report using social media to communi-
cate, especially with young people. Slovenia has 
a Facebook page, as well as using LinkedIn and 
YouTube. VDAB has a VDAB ‘Be a Fan’ on Facebook 
campaign. The French PES uses Twitter to publish 
news and look at the number of times a message 
has been ‘retweeted’ (shared), who has read it and 
how many comments there are on each ‘retweet.’
In highly decentralised systems, local PES offices 
often have different identities and a unified com-
munications strategy is difficult to achieve. In 
Denmark, the local Jobcentres may have different 
messages to each other and their messages may 
conflict with those of ministers and therefore can 
be difficult to manage. Participants reported mixed 
results in using external PR companies to develop 
their PES communications strategies. Denmark 
and Slovenia report relying primarily on upskilled 
internal staff because they are most familiar with 
the PES mission and messages. In some countries 
(for example, Germany) commercial TV adverts 
have been used to make PES programmes and 
services better known, for example, for outreach 
to inactive people to encourage re-entry into the 
labour market. There are however sensitivities in 
certain MS about using particularly commercial 
media to promote PES messages. 
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7. Closing reflections and  
future directions
In their closing remarks participants highlighted 
several themes and possible future directions:
 ● Looking beyond cost benefit analysis is 
important. There are PES social returns that 
are difficult to model or measure, for example, 
combating social inclusion. This is part of the 
PES Network mandate, and specified in the 
legal text establishing it, but there is at present 
little hard evidence on this point. 
 ● Communication activities by PES are an under- 
researched area. There are often negative 
perceptions about PES, despite their positive 
role (placing people into jobs). Communication 
strategies and branding of PES services could 
be further explored by the PES Network.
 ● With technology changes, a large number 
of jobseekers will no longer be involved in 
traditional mediation and PES are therefore 
likely to need to spend more time with the 
hardest to reach. 
 ● Participants expressed a desire to explore each 
of the workshop topics in much greater detail.
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